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Ivy J. Gardner*
I. INTRODUCTION
The death penalty has sparked heated debate for
centuries. The debate has centered on religious beliefs,
constitutional issues, moral values, and cost concerns. The
national economic crisis has put the costs of executions at the
forefront of the debate in recent years. Courts and juries have
begun to consider the cost of execution versus the cost of life
in prison without parole in the realm of capital sentencing.1
These new considerations have no place in death penalty
*
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1 See Judge: Execution, prison costs irrelevant, UPI, Oct. 15, 2010,
available at
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/10/15/JudgeExecution-prison-costs-irrelevant/UPI-37711287115415 (quoting
John C. Blue, a Connecticut Superior Court Judge, rejecting the
defendant’s request to allow testimony on the cost of the state of
execution compared to the cost of life imprisonment); Tennessee v.
Cobbins, State’s Response to Motion to Permit Evidence at
Sentencing Relating to Economic Costs of the Death Penalty, Knox
County, Tenn. (May 12, 2009), available at
http://web.knoxnews.com/pdf/051309carjack.pdf.
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jurisprudence. One’s life, criminal or not, should never be
taken – or spared – based on dollars and cents.
Section II of this note presents a scenario in which a
defendant has been convicted of murder and is now entering
the sentencing phase of his trial. Section III evaluates the
available cost studies of executions around the country.
Section IV focuses on the actual language used in a recent trial
regarding the cost of the death penalty versus life
imprisonment.
Section V considers the various constitutional
arguments surrounding the consideration of execution costs in
the sentencing phase of capital cases. Section VI attempts to
balance the positive and negative aspects of considering
execution costs from both the prosecution and the defense
perspectives. Section VII concludes by evaluating ways to
allow the cost considerations while protecting both the
defendant’s and the state’s rights in a capital case.

II. DOES JOHN DESERVE LIFE
CHEAPER?2

IN

PRISON BECAUSE IT IS

Jane, a six-year-old girl, is outside playing on her
swing set in the backyard. John, a sixty- five-year-old man,
comes out of the woods and starts pushing her on the swing.
Jane is thrilled that John is pushing her because her father was
killed in a car accident when she was three, leaving her with
no father figure in her life. After five minutes on the swing,
John asks Jane if she would like to walk with him to see his
puppy, Izzy. Jane loves puppies and is excited to meet a new
one. Jane goes with John and is not seen again for ten years.
For those ten years, John keeps Jane in a storm cellar
on his property a little over ten miles from Jane’s childhood
home. He rapes Jane on the first day and continues to do so at
least twice a week, sometimes more. He keeps her handcuffed
to the floor of the cellar for the next several years, and feeds
her soup and crackers once a day. John tortures Jane, burning
her with his cigarette or making small slits in her tiny arms
with his hunting knife.

This story is fictional and describes a horrific crime the author
wants readers to consider throughout the note.
2
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Jane screams for help for the first few days until John
binds her mouth with a dirty oil rag and threatens to kill her
“Mommy” if she is not quiet. Jane endlessly shakes with fear
every time she hears a noise at the cellar door. Jane is living
her own hell, at the age of six, with no end in sight.
One day, after ten years of being tortured and raped,
Jane decides that she has to find a way out of the cellar and
away from John. She waits until she hears John’s old truck
start up and back out of the driveway. She slowly comes out of
the cellar, which John stopped locking a few months before,
and smiles at the sight of daylight for the first time in ten
years. She begins to walk toward the road not knowing fully
what her plan is once she sees another person. Jane gets about
half a mile down the road when she hears John’s old truck
coming back. She tries to run but her legs are so fragile that
she has a hard time getting her footing. She falls down right as
John gets to her.
John gets out of the truck yelling, grabs Jane by her
matted hair, and slings her in the bed of his truck like a
ragdoll. A young woman, Julie, drives by and sees the
exchange between John and Jane and notices Jane is crying
hysterically. She does not stop but watches as John pulls into
his driveway and around the back of his house. Julie calls the
local police department and describes to them what she has
just witnessed and tells them the location of John’s home.
John takes Jane back to the cellar and is so angry he
begins to strike her with his belt. Jane is crying hysterically
which makes John even more upset and he begins to strike her
with his fists and kick her. When she does not stop crying,
John takes Jane’s head and bashes it up against the cellar wall
until she is no longer crying and her body goes limp.
John crawls out of the cellar, with a smile on his face,
and begins walking back to his house at the same time law
enforcement is pulling into his driveway. Law enforcement
sees that he is covered in blood, immediately places him under
arrest, and begins looking for the young girl described by
Julie. They find a gruesome bloody scene in the cellar with
Jane’s limp body lying on the floor. John has finally allowed
Jane to escape her hell. She is dead.
John eventually confesses to the kidnapping, torture,
rape, and murder of Jane. He gives law enforcement chilling
details of the last ten years and shows no remorse for his
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actions or for killing the sixteen-year-old Jane. After being
convicted of first degree murder, along with other crimes,
John sits in the courtroom for his sentencing.
The judge gives the jury its instructions and explains to
them the process of determining whether John should be
sentenced to death or life in prison. The defense has asked the
judge to include an instruction detailing the costs of executing
John and the costs of sentencing John to life in prison. This
instruction is important to the defense because the statistics
show that it is cheaper to allow John to live in prison for the
rest of his life than to execute him, and the defense believes
that the jury will spare John’s life because it is the cheaper
option for society during the tough economic times.
This story is a horrific description of the brutal murder
of a young sixteen-year-old girl, who was taken from her
childhood home at the age of six. A young girl, tortured and
raped repeatedly over ten years, and then brutally beaten
when she tried to escape. A man, who has no remorse for
taking the life of such an innocent child, and is going to live or
die based on, among other things, the jury’s feelings about
money and the cost-benefit of the death penalty versus life
imprisonment. Money should not be relevant when
determining whether John lives or dies.

III. STATISTICS SHOW EXECUTIONS ARE MORE EXPENSIVE
THAN LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
This note is not simply about the actual costs of
execution, the actual costs of life in prison or primary based on
statistics. This note is about whether these costs should be
allowed to be a deciding factor in determining when a person
should live or die. With that being said, it is still important to
evaluate the costs of each and assess the costs both nationally
and state by state.3
The following states have abolished the death penalty: Alaska,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(a) (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-46a (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-656(1) (2013);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.1 (West 2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1251
3
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There is no national consensus for the cost of capital
punishment.4 A number of states have never even evaluated
their costs associated with capital punishment.5 “Of the states
where reliable estimates are available, the differing
methodologies used, assumptions made, and applicable
statutes make generalizations difficult.”6 The 2009 Report
from the Death Penalty Information Center puts the numbers
in perspective:
The high costs to the state per execution reflect
the following reality: For a single death penalty
trial, the state may pay $1 million more than for
a non-death penalty trial. But only one in every
three capital trials may result in a death
sentence, so the true cost of that death sentence
is $3 million. Further down the road, only one
in ten of the death sentences handed down may

(2013); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-201(b) (West 2014); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.265, § 2 (West 2013) invalidated by
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984)
(declaring death penalty statute unconstitutional); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.316(1) (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185(a)
(West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-18-14 (West 2013); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney
2013) invalidated by People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004)
(declaring death penalty statute unconstitutional); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-32-01 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2013); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 2303 (West 2013); State v. Provost, 896 A.2d 55 (Vt. 2005)
(declaring death penalty statute unconstitutional); W. VA. CODE § 612-2 (2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.0135(1)(B), § 940.01(1) (West 2013).
See also NPR Staff and Wires, Illinois Abolishes the Death Penalty, NPR
(March 09, 2011), available at
http:www.npr.org/2011/03/09/134394946/Illinois-abolishes-deathpenalty.
4 Richard C. Dieter, Smart on Crime: Reconsidering the Death Penalty in
a Time of Economic Crisis – A Report from the Death Penalty Information
Center (2009) page 17, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/CostsRptFinal.pdf
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Dieter].
5 Id.
6 Id.
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result in an execution. Hence, the cost to the
state to reach that one execution is $30 million.7

All studies that have been conducted regarding the
cost of capital punishment have concluded that execution is
much more expensive than sentencing a person to life in
prison; a capital trial, due to many factors but most notably the
length of capital trials, is much more extensive and expensive,
and there is, generally, far more appellate and other postconviction review of death penalty cases than cases seeking
only life imprisonment.8 According to the Death Penalty
Information Center, there are several ways one can approach
how much capital punishment actually costs.9 First, the costs
of each individual step in a capital case could be calculated,
including the investigation, trial, and appeals; however, this
number would only include a minority of the cases that
actually go through the whole system.10 A second approach is
to “measure the extra cost to the state of arriving at one death
sentence or one execution.”11 Lastly, the total extra costs to the
state for maintaining a capital punishment system could be
assessed on a yearly basis.12
Each of the above approaches has its own pros and
cons. In the first approach, by evaluating each individual step
of a capital case, researchers would be able to break the
statistics down further to determine the most costly step in the
process. This further evaluation would allow legislatures to
target costly areas within the process and take steps to
facilitate lowering the costs of capital cases within their state.
However, as stated above, this evaluation method only
calculates cases that go through the entire process and not all
capital cases. The second approach would allow states to
evaluate capital cases on a case by case basis and determine
the exact price of one execution. This method, however, limits
the calculation to one death sentence when a state may have

Id. at 14 (internal citations omitted).
Id at 6.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
7
8
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numerous executions that cost the state a tremendous amount
of money.
The third approach allows a state to evaluate costs on a
yearly basis which would give the state the ability to budget
more efficiently. The problem with this method is that not
every state will have an execution every year. Rather, if a state
goes without an execution for several years and then has a
person sentenced to death, the extra money needed for that
sentence may not be available within the budget. The third
approach is also too broad in calculating all extra costs
associated with a capital case. Out of the three, the first
method seems to encompass the entire realm of capital case
expenses in its calculations and may be the best evaluation
method.
Several states have conducted research regarding the
cost of their executions. California spends $137 million per
year on the death penalty, system wide, while life in prison
costs only $11.5 million per year.13 Since 1977, California has
averaged less than one execution every two years making the
actual cost per execution over $250 million.14 New York had
no executions but spent $170 million over a nine-year period
of time prior to abolishing capital punishment.15 New Jersey
had no executions but spent $253 million over a twenty-five
year period of time prior to abolition.16 Between 1978 and
1999, Maryland spent $186 million on capital cases but only
had five executions, thus, each execution cost $37 million.17
Different features of a capital punishment system are
also telling of the exponential cost associated with having this
system over a system only offering life in prison as a
maximum punishment. Maryland sought, but did not impose,
the death penalty in 106 cases which cost the state $71

See California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice,
Report and Recommendations on the Administration of the Death Penalty
in California, at 10 (June 30, 2008), available at
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/dp/official/FINAL%20
REPORT%20DEATH%20PENALTY.pdf [hereinafter California
Commission].
14 Id.
15 Dieter, supra note 4, at 14 n.40.
16 Id. at 14 n.41.
17 Id. at 15 n.42.
13
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million.18 “The average cost for the defense at trial in a federal
death case is $620,932, about eight times that of a non-capital
federal murder case.”19 In Kansas, the trial costs for capital
cases are about sixteen times greater than for non-capital
cases, while the appeal costs are twenty-one times higher.20
California spends over $60 million annually to house 670
inmates on death row.21
These staggering numbers reflect several things. First,
there are more people on death row than ever before and each
individual on death row costs an additional $90,000 above
what it would cost to house them for a life in prison
sentence.22 Second, despite the reinstatement of the death
penalty in 1976, since then, there have been fewer executions
per year.23 Third, correctional facilities now have higher
overall operating costs.24 All of these factors taken together
contribute to a higher cost per execution.25 Since capital
punishment was reinstated in 1976, “the country has spent
about $2.5 billion beyond the costs that would have been
incurred if life in prison was the most severe penalty.”26

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR DEATH ELIGIBLE
DEFENDANTS OUTLINED BY THE SUPREME COURT
Over time, the Supreme Court has developed
numerous constitutional protections for death penalty eligible
Id. at 16 n.47.
J. Gould & L. Greenman, OFFICE OF DEFENDER SERVICES OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Update on Cost, Quality,
and Availability of Defense Representation in Federal Death Penalty Cases
at 25 (2008), available at
http:www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/P
ublications/UpdateFederalDeathPenaltyCases.aspx.
20 Legislative Division of Post Audit State of Kansas, Performance
Audit Report - Costs Incurred for Death Penalty Cases: A K-GOAL Audit
of the Department of Corrections at 13 (2003), available at
http://www.kslpa.org/docs/reports/04pa03a.pdf.
21 California Commission, supra note 13, at 70.
22 Dieter, supra note 4, at 15.
23
Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 17.
18
19
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defendants because death is different from any other
punishment that a criminal defendant may face. Capital
defendants are afforded protection against arbitrary and
capricious death sentences. Evidence considered during the
sentencing phase must be both relevant and reliable. The
sentencing phase of a capital trial is subject to the harmless
error doctrine and should all but guarantee a capital
defendant an errorless sentence of death. These constitutional
safeguards are critical to capital sentencing and do not leave
room for consideration of economic evaluations regarding the
cost of execution versus life imprisonment.
A. DEATH IS DIFFERENT
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized
that “death is different.”27 In 1972, the Supreme Court, for the
first time, emphasized that death is exceptional in terms of
punishment for crimes.28 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Brennan stated “death is … an unusually severe punishment,
unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity.”29 In
another concurring opinion, Justice Stewart stated that the
death penalty differed “from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total
irrevocability.”30
The Supreme Court has also noted several times that
death is “qualitatively different.”31 In Woodson v. North
Carolina, the Court noted that “[d]eath, in its finality, differs
See, e.g., Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125 (1991); Clemons v.
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750 n.4 (1990); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496, 509 n.12 (1987); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980). See also, Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker,
Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional
Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 370, 397-401
nn.200-206 (1995) (collecting cases for the proposition that “death is
different”).
28 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
31 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
27
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more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term
differs from one of only a year or two.”32 The Court summed
up why death is different in its opinion in Gardner v. Florida:
[F]ive Members of the Court have now
expressly recognized that death is a different
kind of punishment from any other which may
be imposed in this country. From the point of
view of the defendant, it is different in both its
severity and its finality. From the point of view
of society, the action of the sovereign in taking
the life of one of its citizens also differs
dramatically from any other legitimate state
action. It is of vital importance to the defendant
and to the community that any decision to
impose the death sentence be, and appear to be,
based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion.33
Death is deliberate. Death is final.
B. A SENTENCE OF DEATH CANNOT BE HANDED DOWN IN
AN ARBITRARY & CAPRICIOUS MANNER
Since “death is different,” the Supreme Court has
developed a “greater level of scrutiny of the capital sentencing
determination.”34 Courts must strive to make sure executions
are not handed out in an arbitrary or capricious fashion.35 A
sentence of death is to be reviewed by appellate courts to
avoid arbitrary or unfair application of the death penalty.36
The Supreme Court has developed two general
conditions to minimize the risk of arbitrary action in capital

Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (internal citations
omitted).
34 Ramos, 463 U.S. at 998-99.
35 Id.
36 See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982) (and cases cited
therein).
32
33
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sentencing.37 First, courts must set boundaries on the
sentencer’s judgment to “genuinely narrow the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably
justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.”38
Second, sentencers must be allowed “to consider any relevant
mitigating factor” that might prevent the sentencer from
imposing the death penalty.39
i. THE CLASS OF PERSONS DEATH ELIGIBLE MUST BE
NARROWED
States must adopt statutes and courts must implement
procedures that distinguish between those defendants who
deserve to be executed and those who do not.40 The statutes
and procedures should also guide juries in deciding on which
factors support a sentence of death and those factors which do
not.41
At the sentencing phase, narrowing occurs when the
sentencer is required to determine whether aggravating
circumstances justify imposing the death penalty.42 A
defendant cannot receive a death sentence unless the trier of
fact convicts the defendant of murder and finds at least one
aggravating circumstance at either the guilt or penalty phase.43
An aggravating circumstance must be narrowly tailored
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983); Abdul-Kabir v.
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007).
38 Zant, 462 U.S. at 877; see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428
(1980) (plurality opinion).
39 Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 246.
40 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 427 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
188 (1976) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972)
(White, J., concurring))).
41 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173-74 (2006) (a state statute for
capital sentencing must: “(1) rationally narrow the class of deatheligible defendants; and (2) permit a jury to render a reasoned,
individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible
defendant’s record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances
of his crime.”)
42 Zant, 462 U.S. at 878 (statutory aggravating circumstances
“circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty”).
43 Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 216 (2006).
37
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enough that it does “not apply to every defendant convicted of
a murder. . . .”44
A statute can be effective in limiting the sentencer’s
discretion if the statute provides: (1) “clear and objective
standards”; (2) “specific and detailed guidance”; and (3) “an
opportunity for rational review of the process for imposing a
sentence of death.”45 The Court in Woodson noted procedures
that do not give credence to the character of an individual
defendant or the particular offense “treats all persons
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass
to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.”46
ii. JURIES MUST BE ALLOWED TO CONSIDER MITIGATING
EVIDENCE
As noted above, the Supreme Court has time and time
again stated that juries must be allowed to consider mitigating
evidence that may excuse the imposition of death on a
defendant.47 The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments give a
defendant the right to present mitigating evidence in capital
cases.48 In Lockett, the Court held a sentencer is obliged to
think about mitigating evidence the defendant offers
concerning “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”49
All relevant mitigating evidence must be allowed to be
presented to juries in capital cases and the defendant must be
afforded wide latitude to present the mitigating evidence.50
Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994).
Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (quoting, respectively, Gregg, 428 U.S. at
198; Coley v. Georgia, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976); and Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)).
46 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
47 Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 246. See also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S.
66, 81-82 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111-12 (1982);
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197.
48 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
49 Id.; see also Marsh, 548 U.S. at 173-74.
50 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). See also Abdul-Kabir,
550 U.S. at 264 (statutory requirement that jury consider only
44
45
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Sentencers in capital cases “must give independent weight” to
each mitigating circumstance.51 However, when evaluating
mitigating factors, the sentencer does not have free
discretion.52 In Brown, the Court upheld the trial court’s
instruction warning the jury to not be swayed by “mere
sympathy” when making the determination to give a death
sentence.53 The Brown Court concluded that a reasonable juror
would interpret the instruction to mean that he or she should
ignore emotional responses that are not rooted in the
aggravating and mitigating evidence and that states may
prohibit juries from basing their sentencing decisions on
factors not presented at the trial.54
It is imperative that capital sentencing juries avoid an
arbitrary and capricious application of the death sentence. If
the above statistics were to swing the other direction and show
that executions were less expensive than imprisoning a person
for life, juries allowed to consider these cost evaluations may
begin to arbitrarily put defendants to death because it is
cheaper for society to do so. By allowing these costs to be
considered, regardless of the side to which the pendulum
swings, courts open themselves up to a direct violation of the
Supreme Court’s rule against arbitrarily applying the death
penalty.
Allowing juries to consider the cost of execution versus
the cost of life in prison without parole does not meet the
Supreme Court requirement of narrowing the class of death
eligible persons. To consider the statistics as they are now,
juries would not sentence any defendants to death because it is
cheaper for society to keep them in prison for the rest of their
particular kinds of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional);
Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 289 (2007) (sentencer may not
be precluded from “giving meaningful effect to mitigating
evidence”); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608 (plurality opinion) (sentencer
cannot be precluded from considering character or circumstance of
defendant’s record).
51 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion); Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987).
52 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1987).
53 Id.
54 Id. (The jury in Brown had been instructed not to be swayed by
“mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public
opinion or public feeling.”).
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lives. It is understandable why a defendant would want to
offer the statistics as mitigating evidence. However, the
purpose of aggravating and mitigating evidence is to allow the
jury to evaluate the individual defendant and the crime itself.
Even though the statistics would be an extremely powerful
mitigating argument to keep the defendant alive, the statistics
do not go toward the individual defendant or the murder itself
and should not be considered by a jury when determining
whether to impose a sentence of death.
C. SENTENCING EVIDENCE MUST BE RELEVANT AND
RELIABLE
The Eighth Amendment demands any part of a capital
case be analyzed under a higher level of scrutiny if that part of
the case affects the sentencing determination.55 A heightened
standard of reliability is required when determining whether
death is the most appropriate punishment.56 Constitutional
standards “require inquiry into the reliability, relevance,
value, and prejudicial effect of sentencing evidence to preserve
fundamental fairness and protect the rights of both the
defendant and the victim’s family.”57 Unless the evidence is
both relevant and reliable, it should not be considered during
the sentencing phase of a capital case.
The Federal Rules of Evidence demand that only
material that relates closely to the facts of a case be considered
by the trier of fact.58 Rule 402 clearly states that relevant
evidence is admissible while irrelevant evidence is not.59
Relevant evidence means “evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.”60 Trial judges are also
given the discretion to find relevant evidence inadmissible if
the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
New York v. Arthur, 673 N.Y.S.2d 486, 493-94 (N.Y. 1997).
Id. at 494.
57 Tennessee v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tenn. 2001).
58 FED. R. EVID. 401, 402, & 403.
59 FED. R. EVID. 402.
60 FED. R. EVID. 401.
55
56
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misleading to the jury.61 The United States Supreme Court has
stated that mitigating evidence is admissible in capital cases
and only has to meet a low threshold test for relevance to be
admitted.62
Execution cost-benefit evidence does not meet the
relevance test under either the Federal Rules of Evidence or
precedent. This evidence is irrelevant because it does not have
a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. Jurors can make the same sentence
determination with this evidence as they would without the
evidence. Also, this evidence does not relate to the “existence
of any fact that is of consequence” but only relates to how
much a state may pay for its capital punishment system to be
implemented.
Even if the cost-benefit evidence is found to be
relevant, courts should still find it inadmissible under Rule
403. By allowing parties to discuss the cost of executions
during the sentencing phase of a capital trial, juries may
confuse the issues involved in this phase. The issue in the
sentencing phase of a capital trial is to determine whether the
defendant receives the death penalty or a lesser punishment.
The issue is not one of how much an execution may cost and it
is critical that jurors not be allowed to confuse these two issues
at such a crucial part of a capital case.
The cost of an execution versus the costs of life
imprisonment has no relevance to a capital sentencing phase.
Only relevant aggravating and mitigating evidence that
reflects on the individual defendant or the crime itself should
be considered in the penalty phase of a capital case. A
Connecticut Superior Court Judge recently dealt with the
relevance of these costs evaluations and stated:
Economic arguments tailored to specific
individuals are not only irrelevant but perverse.
From an economic view, it will thus be more
expensive to incarcerate the younger defendant
FED. R. EVID. 403.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 568; see also Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 28488 (2004) (rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s test for “constitutional
relevance”).
61
62
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for the remainder of his life and – in strict
economic terms – more cost-effective to execute
him. . . . This argument plainly makes no moral
sense.63

Overall, statistics tend to be an unreliable source of
information. “Statistics is as much an art as it is a science.”64
One author, Darrell Huff, has coined statistical manipulation
as “statisticulation,” or in other words the use of statistical
information to misinform society.65 Statistics are vulnerable to
various manipulations and distortions.66 “The secret language
of statistics, so appealing in a fact-minded culture, is
employed
to
sensationalize,
inflate,
confuse,
and
67
oversimplify.” “A well-wrapped statistic is better than
Hitler’s “big lie”[;] it misleads, yet it cannot be pinned on
you.”68
To illustrate how easy it is to manipulate the same
statistics to fit one’s agenda, Huff proposes the following
example:
You can, for instance, express exactly the same
fact by calling it a one percent return on sales, a
fifteen percent return on investment, a tenmillion-dollar profit, an increase in profits of
forty percent, or a decrease of sixty percent
from last year. The method is to choose the one
that sounds best for the purpose at hand and
Judge: Execution, prison costs irrelevant, UPI, Oct. 15, 2010, available at
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/10/15/JudgeExecution-prison-costs-irrelevant/UPI-37711287115415 (quoting
John C. Blue, a Connecticut Superior Court Judge, rejecting the
defendant’s request to allow testimony on the cost of the state of
execution compared to the cost of life imprisonment)(internal
quotations omitted).
64 Darrell Huff, HOW TO LIE WITH STATISTICS 120 (W.W. Norton &
Company 1954) available at http://www.horace.org/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/How-to-Lie-With-Statistics-1954Huff.pdf.
65 Id. at 100.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 8.
68 Id. at 9.
63
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trust that few who read it will recognize how
imperfectly it reflects the situation.69
Going on this proposition, the statistics regarding the
cost of the death penalty and the cost of life in prison without
parole are fatally flawed. The statistics that are available are
based on a judicial system where the death penalty is the
ultimate penalty. If life in prison without parole was the
ultimate penalty, the statistics would show that penalty to be
much more expensive than the lesser penalty of life in prison
with the option for parole. These statistics are developed to
promote anti-death penalty arguments and can be skewed in a
variety of ways to lend credence to any proposition one may
want to propose. To allow a jury to consider statistics that can
fluctuate, as needed, while deciding whether or not a
defendant lives or dies is absurd.
The individual execution costs will vary depending on
the age of the defendant, the execution procedure used by the
state in which the execution is carried out, etc. This dynamic
shows that the statistical numbers can always be skewed and
used in ways that promote whatever policy argument or
reasoning one may want to promote. To determine whether
one lives or dies based on flawed, irrelevant, unreliable
statistics or statistics that can easily be altered should not be
allowed in capital cases.
D. AN ERROR IN CAPITAL SENTENCING MAY BE
CONSTITUTIONALLY HARMLESS BUT IT IS STILL AN ERROR
The harmless error doctrine was first developed by the
United States Supreme Court in 1967.70 In Chapman, the Court
decided that even though an error is constitutional, that does
not render that error resistant to the harmless error analysis.71
The Court also found that some constitutional errors were so
fundamental as to defy harmless error analysis and to thus be
automatically reversed.72 The Chapman Court established the
rule for determining whether an error was in fact a harmless
Id. at 82.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
71 Id. at 22.
72 Id. at 23.
69
70
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error: “before a federal constitutional error can be held
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”73
In 1988, the Court held that the Chapman test was
equally applicable in the penalty phase of a capital case.74 The
Court, in Satterwhite, held: “it is important to avoid error in
capital sentencing proceedings. Moreover, the evaluation of
the consequences of an error in the sentencing phase of a
capital case may be more difficult because of the discretion
given to the sentencer.”75 The only time the Court has found
automatic reversible error in a capital case is where a juror has
been found to be so pro-capital punishment that he is
effectively unable to not impose a death sentence.76
The purpose of the harmless error test “reflect[s] a
balancing of the defendant’s interests in an error-free
proceeding against the societal interest in finality and judicial
economy.”77 James Scoville has summed it up nicely: “any
error in capital sentencing implicates some constitutional
concerns…the
constitutionally
compelled
sentencing
discretion in capital punishment proceedings may be
undermined by error regardless of whether an independent
constitutional right is violated.”78
Allowing a jury to consider the cost of execution versus
the cost of life imprisonment should be deemed an error. One
can call it “harmless error” but it is still an error and it is an
error in a case that determines whether a person lives or dies.
We should strive for a perfect system and an error in death
sentencing is a permanent mistake and is greater than any
other mistake allowed in criminal jurisprudence.

Id. at 24.
Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988).
75 Id. at 258.
76 The term “Morgan Precept” comes from the case of Morgan v.
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).
77James C. Scoville, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in Capital
Sentencing, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 740, 744 (1987) (quoting United States v.
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 502 (1983) (criticizing lower court for its failure
“to strike the balance between disciplining the prosecutor on the one
hand, and the interest in the prompt administration of justice and the
interests of the victim on the other”)).
78 Id. at 757.
73
74
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V. SHOULD JURIES BE ALLOWED TO EVALUATE EXECUTION
COSTS IN CAPITAL CASE SENTENCING?
There are valid arguments on both sides regarding
these cost evaluations. A juror, as a taxpayer, has a vested
interest in the cost of all trials, especially costly capital murder
trials. The statistics available calculate the average cost of
executions and do not allow jurors to evaluate what the
individual trial they are sitting for will cost. There is no
national standard or national agency that calculates the cost of
executions on average around the nation so the statistics
provided are fundamentally flawed since they are not a
national average but only an average for a few states.
A. JURIES HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN COSTS
As taxpayers, every juror in every trial has a vested
interest in the cost of that prosecution. The costs of a trial
include the prosecutor’s salary, court-appointed defense
counsel, the judge’s salary, law enforcement salaries, and
other various trial costs. These costs are high in a normal
criminal trial but, due to many factors such as the length of a
capital trial and the cost of mandatory expert witnesses, are
exponentially increased in a capital murder trial as shown in
the statistics above. As the expense of trials increase, local
taxes likely will be increased to cover the extra costs.
When calculated, the actual cost per execution per year
to individual taxpayers is actually quite minimal.79 The United
States has spent around $2.5 billion on capital cases since
1976.80 Taxpayers spent, on average, thirty-one cents per year
on capital cases from 1976 to 2010.81 Individual taxpayers pay
To determine the following calculations, the author used the
statistics included in Section II and divided them by the individual
state and national census figures, respectively. Note only population
of eighteen and over was used in these calculations since author
intends to calculate taxpayer expense. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 Population
Estimates, available at http://www.census.gov.
80 Dieter, supra note 4, at 15.
81 $2.5 billion over 34 years (1976-2010) = $7,352,411 per
year/population of 234,564,071 = $.31 cents per year.
79
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around $4.90 a year for capital cases in California.82 Taxpayers
in New York and New Jersey paid less than $1.50 per year for
their capital punishment system prior to their states’ abolition
of the death penalty.83 Maryland taxpayers paid around $2.00
per year for their capital punishment system.84 These figures
show that the actual cost to individual jurors, as taxpayers, is
nominal and goes to show that jurors do not have the vested
interests that one might think when looking at the larger
overall state costs.
While the jurors may have a vested interest as
taxpayers, the “death penalty itself is not on trial” when it
comes to cost evaluations.85 The better venue to evaluate the
cost of execution compared to the cost of life in prison without
parole is within the legislature, whether it is on a federal or an
individual state level. Leland Price, Tennessee Assistant
District Attorney General, recently stated, “public debate
among our policy makers concerning the economic costs of the
death penalty is one thing, presenting such evidence to a
capital jury trying to make an individualized sentencing
decision is another.”86
By allowing jurors, as taxpayers, to evaluate the cost of
execution versus life in prison without parole, courts allow the
jurors’ personal finances to come into the sentencing equation.
A capital murder trial is not the place for personal finances to
have such a huge impact on whether or not the defendant
lives or dies. In times of economic hardship, the decision to
render the death penalty would shift in light of individual
jurors’ financial situations instead of being evaluated in terms
of the individual convicted of murder and the circumstances
surrounding the crime itself.
California Commission, supra note 13 ($137 million per
year/population of 27,958,916 = $4.90 per year).
83 Dieter, supra note 4 at, 15-16 (New Jersey: $252 million over 20
years = $10,080,000 per year/population of 6,726,680 = $1.50 per
year; New York: $170 million over 9 years = $18,888,888 per
year/population of 15,053,173 = $1.25 per year).
84 Id. at 17 ($186 million over 20 years = $9,300,000 per
year/population of 4,420,588 = $2.10 per year).
85 Tennessee v. Cobbins, 2009 WL 2115350, State’s Response to
Motion to Permit Evidence at Sentencing Relating to Economic Costs
of the Death Penalty, Knox County, Tenn. (May 12, 2009).
86 Id.
82
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B. NO CASE BY CASE STATISTICS ARE AVAILABLE
There are no individual death penalty trial cost
statistics available. Each case is different in facts, investigation
methods, trial strategy, appeals, and post-conviction
procedures. Therefore, the cost of each capital murder case
differs from the next and can differ tremendously.
In Lockett, the Supreme Court determined that the jury
in a capital murder trial is to make a decision appropriate for
the individual defendant in light of the crimes he has
committed.87 The Court reasoned “[g]iven that the imposition
of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all
other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an
individualized decision is essential in capital cases.”88
To allow non-individualized cost evaluations to play a
part in a jury’s decision to determine whether the defendant
lives or if the defendant is executed is contrary to Supreme
Court capital murder jurisprudence. The Court has made clear
that capital case sentencing determinations are to be made on
an individual defendant and individual crime basis. Since
individual case statistics are unavailable in the death penalty
arena, courts should not allow juries to consider the difference
in execution and life in prison without parole in terms of cost.
Juries should only be allowed to consider the characteristics of
the individual defendant and the circumstances of the
individual crime committed.
C. NO NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR EVALUATION OF COSTS
No national evaluation standard exists for evaluating
the cost of executions and life in prison without parole in each
state. With no national evaluation standard in place, all fifty
states could implement a different method of evaluation. If
different evaluation methods are used, the number of
variables considered during the statistical analysis can make
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605. See also Sims, 45 S.W.3d at 29 (holding that
evidence regarding the nature and circumstances of the crime or
relating to the defendant’s character and background is admissible in
order to meet the constitutional requirement that sentencing be
conducted in an individualized manner.).
88 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
87
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the eventual statistics inconsistent among the various states.
The different parts that would have to be pieced together to
gather a comprehensive economic picture on the costs of
execution will vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
depending on the evaluation method.
As mentioned above, not all death penalty states have
statistics available regarding the cost of execution or the cost
of life in prison without parole. If death penalty states want to
begin to allow juries to consider the costs of executions during
the sentencing phase of capital cases, they should develop a
national committee to determine how these costs are
calculated and the variables that must be considered when
making these calculations. These steps would make the
statistics more reliable and allow juries to make true
determinations regarding the actual costs involved instead of
relying on fluffed numbers as they stand now.

VI. HOW DO WE AVOID THE TROUBLES OF FLAWED
STATISTICS THAT MAY DETERMINE WHETHER ONE IS
SENTENCED TO LIFE OR TO DEATH?
Courts have three options in determining how costbenefit evidence is admitted into the sentencing phase of a
capital trial: (1) courts may allow only the capital defendant to
present the evidence; (2) once a defendant offers the statistical
evidence, the courts may choose to allow the prosecution to
respond to the argument; or (3) courts may choose to
completely exclude any cost-benefit evidence or arguments.
While each of these options have their benefits, ultimately
courts should follow the latter and not allow execution costbenefit evidence or arguments at the sentencing phase of
capital cases.
A. ONLY THE CAPITAL DEFENDANT CAN PRESENT
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF EXECUTION COST
Courts may decide to only allow the defense to admit
the information regarding cost of execution versus life
imprisonment. This information can be a valuable asset to a
capital defendant and potentially spare the defendant’s life.
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Defense attorneys owe a duty to each client to protect
their constitutional rights and freedoms. This duty does not
become less important when a client is charged with capital
murder. If anything, the duty becomes more important to
spare the life of the client. Defense counsel must attempt to
sway the jury to spare the life of his or her client and make
jurors aware of any information that may possibly sway their
sentencing decision in favor of life in prison. To this point, it
is imperative for defense counsel to take all avenues available
to avoid a sentence of death and offering this statistical
information for jury consideration is an avenue that must at
least be attempted.
A capital defendant has a valid argument that these
statistics are a form of mitigating evidence that should be
considered by the jury during the sentencing phase. As the
statistics stand now, the defendant can make a powerful
argument to the jury to sentence him to a term of life in prison
because that sentence would save the jurors, as taxpayers, a
tremendous amount of money. If a court finds this argument
to be persuasive and determines the information to be
mitigating, defendants around the country could be spared
from execution.
If one’s life is being determined by twelve people,
those people should be allowed to consider anything and
everything while making their determination to take the life of
another. Human nature and compassion seems to say that
courts should not deny a defendant the right to plea for his life
in any manner necessary. If this plea includes using statistical
data that may curtail a jury from sentencing a defendant to
death, then so be it.
B. ONCE THE DEFENDANT OPENS THE DOOR, THE
PROSECUTION CAN RUN THROUGH IT
Courts may decide to allow the defendant to admit the
information regarding the cost of execution first and then
allow the prosecution to counter the information with their
own arguments. It would only seem fair to allow the
prosecution to counter any arguments made by the defendant,
especially statistical arguments.
Since the statistics are in favor of the capital defendant,
the only avenue the prosecution has available is to tug at the
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emotions of the jury. They may remind the jury of how
heinous the defendant’s actions were. The prosecution may
also introduce the costs to the victim and the victim’s family.
They may agree the cost of executing the defendant is high;
however, that cost can in no way outweigh the cost of losing a
relative.
Why should the defendant be given the chance to live
based on the cost of executions when the defendant took the
life of an innocent person? How low do the costs have to drop
before you will deliver justice for the innocent life taken by the
defendant? The judicial system is supposed to seek justice; are
you going to allow money to alter what the system is designed
to do? These are all questions the prosecution may ask the jury
when trying to counter a capital defendant’s arguments
regarding the cost of execution.
A prosecutor may focus on the fact that the cost of a
punishment should never matter, especially when a person’s
life has been taken by another. Cost of punishment may be a
valid consideration in misdemeanor or lower felony cases
when the options are limited to incarceration or probation or
community service. However, the cost of execution versus the
cost of life imprisonment has no place in capital sentencing.
A prosecutor may explain to the jury that the majority
of these costs are sunk costs that, in reality, never affect the
individual jurors as taxpayers. The trial costs, including
prosecutorial salaries, law enforcement salaries, judge salaries,
are costs that are going to be paid whether those individuals
are working on a capital case or on a misdemeanor case. These
individuals do not receive overtime pay for the extra time put
into a capital trial. Therefore, the jurors should not put a
tremendous amount of faith into a defendant’s arguments
based on execution costs.
C. EXECUTION COST-BENEFIT EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS
SHOULD BE INADMISSIBLE IN CAPITAL CASES
Courts should not allow the information regarding the
cost of execution and life in prison without parole into the
realm of death penalty jurisprudence. The courts have juggled
the many constitutional safeguards surrounding the death
penalty along with the moral realms of the death penalty for
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years. To allow economic evaluations to come into play is
opening death penalty jurisprudence up to further attack.
Death is different. The decision of whether or not to
take a person’s life is the ultimate decision a capital juror has
to make. This decision will forever weigh on a juror’s mind.
Allowing parties to present execution cost arguments
to a capital jury is arbitrary and capricious in and of itself.
Today, if used, the statistics could potentially allow all capital
defendants to escape execution. The statistics may drastically
change tomorrow and potentially allow all capital defendants
to receive a death sentence because it is cheaper for society to
execute. Depending on the statistics of the day, you live or you
die. This is the exact thing the Supreme Court has tried to
avoid in developing the protections afforded by defendants
from arbitrary and capricious actions by the courts.
By allowing cost-benefit evidence and arguments into
the sentencing phase of a capital case, courts will make the
decision a personal decision for the jurors to make instead of a
decision based on the circumstances surrounding the crime
and the individual defendant. The purpose of the sentencing
phase is to allow the jury to determine one’s punishment
based on aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Execution
statistics do not fit under either of those categories and should
not be admissible in the sentencing phase of a capital trial. The
punishment decision is not a personal decision; it is a decision
to be made based on the evidence submitted at trial regarding
the crime itself and the character of the defendant – nothing
more, nothing less.
One could go on for days about the relevance and
reliability of statistics. Suffice it to say, the statistics offered
above are neither relevant nor reliable and have absolutely no
business being admitted into a capital case. The cost statistics
are completely irrelevant to the crime of murder or any
circumstances that might surround the crime. The statistics are
also irrelevant to the character or background of a capital
defendant. These statistics can be twisted to promote one
public policy and twisted again to meet another. A famous
quote sums up the reliability of statistics nicely: “There are
three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.”89 The cost
Former British Prime Minister Benjamin “Disraeli would often
apply with justice and force: ‘There are three kinds of lies: lies,
89
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of execution statistics are irrelevant and unreliable and should
not find their way into death penalty jurisprudence.
Since capital trial errors are evaluated under the
harmless error doctrine, it would likely be impossible for
appellate courts to properly evaluate the effects of allowing
this statistical information and determine if a harmful error
had actually occurred. With the cost-benefit evidence being
questionable, at best, trial courts should avoid putting
appellate courts in the predicament of trying to guess what
jurors are thinking as they make sentencing determinations.
As previously stated, the admittance of execution cost
evidence should be deemed an error. Harmless or harmful, an
error is still an error. The judicial system should strive to be a
perfect system even if that goal seems unattainable at times.
An error of this magnitude can easily be avoided by courts
holding that cost-benefit evidence and arguments regarding
executions are inadmissible.

VII. CONCLUSION
The death penalty has been under attack for many
years and the resulting debate has focused on various topics
that put people’s values into play. To allow an economic
element into the sentencing phase of capital cases will only
open the death penalty up for further criticism. Money should
not be an option when determining whether a person lives or
dies.

damned lies, and statistics.’” MARK TWAIN, CHAPTERS FROM MY
AUTOBIOGRAPHY- XX 471 (1907), available at
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/19987/19987-h/19987-h.htm.

